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Group Key Agreement Protocol for MANETs
Based on HSK Scheme
Xinyu Lei, Xiaofeng Liao Senior Member, IEEE , and Yonghong Xiong
Abstract—In this paper, we first provide a spanning tree (ST)-based centralized group key agreement protocol for unbalanced mobile
Ad Hoc networks (MANETs). Based on the centralized solution, a local spanning tree (LST)-based distributed protocol for general
MANETs is subsequently presented. Both protocols follow the basic features of the HSK scheme: 1) H means that a hybrid approach,
which is the combination of key agreement and key distribution via symmetric encryption, is exploited; 2) S indicates that a ST or
LSTs are adopted to form a connected network topology; and 3) K implies that the extended Kruskal algorithm is employed to handle
dynamic events. It is shown that the HSK scheme is a uniform approach to handle the initial key establishment process as well as all
kinds of dynamic events in group key agreement protocol for MANETs. Additionally, the extended Kruskal algorithm enables to realize
the reusability of the precomputed secure links to reduce the overhead. Moreover, some other aspects, such as the network topology
connectivity and security, are well analyzed.
Index Terms—hybrid, spanning tree, extended Kruskal algorithm, group key agreement, MANETs
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
MObile Ad Hoc networks (MANETs) are currentlydeployed in many areas ranging from military,
emergency, rescue mission to other collaborative appli-
cations for commercial use. The rapidly growing appli-
cation of MANETs heightens the security concerns of
such networks. Designing secure and efficient group key
agreement protocols for MANETs has attracted signifi-
cant attention. A group key agreement protocol enables
a group of participants to communicate over untrusted,
open networks to come up with a common secret value
called a session key. Theoretically, group key establish-
ment is more efficient than pairwise key establishment as
the communicating nodes do not waste resources every
time they wish to communicate with another device.
Most group key agreement protocols are based on
generalization of the two-party Diffie-Hellman (DH) [1]
protocol. It is proposed by Imgemarsson et al. [2] the
first group key agreement protocol. A more efficient
BD protocol, which requires only two rounds by us-
ing a ring structure of participants, is introduced in
[3]. Subsequently, Steiner et al. [4] provides a serial of
GDH protocols which are called the natural extension
of the original DH protocol. Hypercube protocol is in-
troduced in [5] in which the participants are arranged
in a logical hypercube. Beside the above static protocols,
particular attention is paid to design dynamic protocols
which are capable of handling the membership changes.
As a typical example of dynamic protocols, TGDH [6]
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protocol employs tree structure, in which any node can
compute the group key if it knows all the keys in its co-
path. Unfortunately, this requirement makes the protocol
quite expensive in storage and computation. Barus et al.
[7] presents BDS protocol which is also based on tree
structure. It is the only one that makes use of the parings
and ternary trees. There have been a tremendous amount
of dynamic group key agreement protocols [8]–[17]. One
may refer to [18] for a detailed survey.
Most of the above traditional dynamic protocols are
efficient for wired networks but they cannot be directly
applied to MANETs because of dynamic and multi-hop
nature of mobile nodes. Indeed, most protocols for wired
networks have assumed that the communication cost
between any pair of group members is one unit, which is
not practical in wireless multi-hop MANETs. In contrast,
unlike wired networks, the nodes in a MANETs are
energy constrained (often powered by batteries) with
limited storage and the usage of wireless communication
implies a limited bandwidth. As a result, the nodes
in MANETs have limited communication, computation,
and storage ability. In addition, the global broadcast
in MANETs is probably infeasible in MANETs. The
membership changes rapidly due to the high mobility
of nodes. Moreover, the mobile nodes lack pre-shared
knowledge, and the multi-hop wireless links are vulner-
able. As a consequence, it remains challenging to design
group key agreement protocol in MANETs.
1.1 Related Work
In recent few years, some group key agreement protocols
using certain structures, e.g., tree or cluster, have shown
their superiorities in designing group key agreement
protocol in MANETs. They are referred to as hierarchical
protocols in this paper.
2Regarding to the tree-based protocols, a ST network
structure is employed in AT-GDH protocol [19], which
realizes that all communications are based on one-hop
transmission. But the protocol requires too much expo-
nentiations to derive a common session key which is not
computationally efficient in the mobile environment.
The seminal cluster-based group key agreement proto-
col is first proposed in [20], and then further developed
in [21]–[25]. The concept of connected dominating set is
introduced in [20] to handle key agreement protocol.
However, the protocol is inefficient to handle dynamic
events. There are a few proposals for key agreement
protocols by means of using pairing [21], [23], [26].
The protocol in [26] exploit the concept of virtual back-
bone node with leaf nodes as participants. Unlike [26],
the internal nodes in [21], [23] are also participants.
The pairing-based protocols, however, are computation-
intensive which impedes their application in MANETs.
Based on AT-GDH, it is presented in [22] a solution
which employs BD protocol within each cluster and
invokes AT-GDH protocol by employing a ST of spon-
sors. Unfortunately, this protocol is static and handling
dynamic events are not easy for this scheme. Impres-
sively, a hybrid HP-1 protocol is presented in [25]. After
the cluster construction, the BD algorithm is invoked to
generate the session key within the cluster, and then the
root node generates a random session key and sends it to
other nodes via the established secure links. It is shown
that the HP-1 protocol is very efficient, since it makes
use of a hierarchical structure to manage the dynamic
events, and employs the symmetric encryption algorithm
to distribute the session key from the root node to
other nodes. Different with the previous work, the HP-
1 protocol takes advantage of the symmetric encryption
algorithm which is regarded to be more efficient than
the asymmetric encryption algorithm. A detailed survey
of the cluster-based algorithms can be found in [27].
After having an overview of these existing hierarchical
protocols, especially the cluster-based protocols, main
notable merits are identified as follows.
• A hierarchical structure is adopted to handle the
dynamic events efficiently.
• A hybrid encryption is employed. This approach
can reduce the computation overhead, and there-
fore, it is quite suitable for MANETs with resource-
constrained mobile nodes.
We also identifies some common drawbacks in these
existing hierarchical protocols.
• Clustering method is not easy to handle certain
member events, such as a cluster head node leaving
from the network. More precisely, it is rather costly
to use clustering method to deal with the situation
that several cluster head nodes leaving from the
network at the same time.
• Distinct complex algorithms should be carefully
designed for handling different kinds of dynamic
events. Intuitively, a better approach is to use one
uniform algorithm to deal with all these events.
In this paper, we aim to design a group key agreement
scheme which inherits the above merits and overcomes
the above drawbacks.
1.2 Contributions
We regard the main contributions of this paper as five-
fold.
1) The weight function is introduced which jointly
considers high communication efficiency and energy
balance.
2) Hybrid encryption technique applies the symmetric
encryption algorithm which is regarded to be more
efficient than asymmetric encryption algorithm.
3) The extended Kruskal algorithm is very efficient to
handle dynamic events. All kinds of dynamic events
are well addressed by only one uniform algorithm,
whereas other approaches always involve in de-
signing several sophisticated algorithms to handle
different kinds of dynamic events, e.g., [25].
4) The extended Kruskal algorithm enables to realize
the reusability of the precomputed secure links, and
thus reduces the overhead.
5) There is no global broadcast in the proposed proto-
cols. That is to say, all transmissions are based on
one-hop transmission.
1.3 Organization
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Sec-
tion 2 provides the centralized spanning tree (ST)-based
protocol. The distributed local spanning tree (LST)-based
protocol is described in Section 3. In Section 4, some
properties of the network topology are theoretically
studied. The protocol properties and security are ana-
lyzed in Section 5 and Section 6, followed by Section 7
which summarizes the paper.
2 THE CENTRALIZED ST-BASED PROTOCOL
In hierarchical group key agreement protocols, the man-
agement of the topology, tree or cluster, can be either cen-
tralized or distributed. In the first approach, a member
of the group is responsible for the topology maintenance.
While the second approach involves all group members
in the topology maintenance. Remarkably, the words
”centralized” and ”distributed” are in terms of the topol-
ogy maintenance process. In this section, a centralized
solution for a special kind of MANETs is constructed.
This solution paves a way for better understanding the
distributed solution for general MANETs.
In some applications, MANETs can be regarded as
unbalanced networks which consist of many resource-
constrained mobile nodes called normal nodes and a
powerful node called leader node with less restriction. We
refer to this kind of MANETs as unbalanced MANETs.
Shown in Fig. 1 is an example of unbalanced MANETs,
where a tank serves as a leader node and many soldiers
3Fig. 1. An example of unbalanced MANETs.
work as normal nodes to collect useful battlefield in-
formation and transmit it to the tank. Another example
is urban vehicular ad hoc networks. It can be regarded
as unbalanced MANETs where city central base station
works as a leader node and many vehicles act as normal
nodes.
We formalize the assumptions of unbalanced MANETs
as follows.
A1) The leader node covers all normal nodes.
A2) All normal nodes are homogeneous with an identi-
cal transmission range.
According to Assumption A1, the leader node can trans-
mit message to all normal nodes directly, whereas that
normal nodes transmit message to the leader node
should rely on mediate nodes. Mathematically, the trans-
mission range of nodes is defined as
Di=
{
dleader ≥ max{d11, . . . , d1n}, if i = 1
dnormal, if i = 2, . . . , n
where dij denotes the physical distance between node vi
and node vj . V is the set of participant nodes in network,
n = |V | is the number of nodes in V , and (vi, vj) is
the edge that connects node vi and node vj . A unique
ID is assigned to each node. For notational simplicity,
ID(vi) = i.
Definition 1. (Directly Connected Relationship): Node vi has
directly connected relationship with node vj , if node vi can
directly transmit message to node vj , i.e., dij < Di , denoted
as vi → vj . It follows that vi ↔ vj , if and only if vi → vj
and vi ← vj .
Definition 1 and Assumption A1 yield v1 → vi,
∀i ∈ {2, . . . , n}. And it follows that vi → vj , where
i 6= j and i, j > 1, if and only if vi ← vj . That is to
say, the connection between two normal nodes must be
bidirectional.
2.1 Fundamental Procedures
2.1.1 Topology Construction
Normal nodes own the ability of local broadcast, i.e., a
node can broadcast information to its one-hop away
neighbor nodes.
Algorithm 1 Procedure T-C (Topology Construction)
1: Each node locally broadcasts a Hello Message,
which contains its unique ID;
2: Each node sends an ID Message which contains
its ID and its neighbors’ IDs to the leader node.
In this way, the leader node constructs the network
topology.
2.1.2 Design and Calculation of Weight Function
A weight function is introduced to jointly consider high
communication efficiency and energy balance. For this
purpose, normal node should send extra information
(called a Weight Message), which contains the posi-
tion and power available of the node, to the leader node.
As an example, the weight function can be designed as
Wij = f(dij , PAi, PAj) ={
+∞, if dij > dnormal,
M + α · dij − β ·min{PAi, PAj}, if dij ≤ dnormal,
where Wij represents the weight of edge (vi, vj), and
PAi (PAj) represents the power available of node vi (vj).
α and β are the ratio parameters. A large constant M is
selected, such that M + α · dij − β ·min{PAi, PAj} > 0.
Note that the smaller Wij of an edge, the higher
probability it will be selected in the ST (see the ex-
tended Kruskal algorithm for the detailed reason). If
dij > dnormal, or equivalently, vi and vj are disconnected
in network topology, set W = +∞. If dij < dnormal, to
construct a communication efficient ST, Wij should be
an increasing function of dij , as communication power
consumption is, in general, of the form c ·dr, r > 2, i.e., a
strictly increasing function of the Euclidean distance. On
the other hand, Wij should be a decreasing function of
min{PAi, PAj}. As a result, an edge that connects two
energy-rich nodes has higher probability to be selected
in the ST. There are three points worth mentioning here.
The first is the ratio parameters, i.e., α and β, should be
carefully determined according to the requirements of
practical applications. Second, we only do a qualitative
analysis of how to design the weight function f by con-
sidering only two factors. It is notable that, if required,
other factors can also be taken into consideration. The
third one is that, if necessary, the weight function can be
designed as any nonlinear function which follows our
aforementioned qualitative analysis. The procedure to
calculate weight for each edge is described below.
Algorithm 2 Procedure C-W (Calculate Weight)
1: Each normal node sends a Weight Message to the
leader node;
2: The leader node calculates the weight for each edge
according to a predefined weight function f .
42.1.3 ST Construction
After the execution of Procedure T-C and Procedure C-
W, the leader node can obtain the network topology and
weight of each edge, on the basis of which the leader
node can construct a ST by using Kruskal algorithm
[28] or Prim algorithm [29]. However, the topology of
the constructed ST is unknown to normal nodes in
the network. Given this, the ST needs to be further
constructed among these normal nodes in the network.
We assume that the leader node has constructed a ST.
Below is the procedure to construct the ST among the
normal nodes.
Algorithm 3 Procedure S-C (ST Construction)
1: The leader node transmits neighbors’ IDs (called a
Notification Message) to each normal node in
the constructed ST. In this way, each normal node
is aware of which nodes are its neighbors in the
constructed ST;
2: For each edge in the ST, two nodes perform a two-
party public key exchange algorithm, e.g., DH pro-
tocol [1], to generate a pair of key. Evidently, an edge
in the ST implies a pairwise public key establishment
process, and all of them are executed simultaneously.
The edges which have performed the public exchange
algorithm are referred as secure links, and the generated
key is referred as secure link key. When the pairwise
public key establishment is finished, two adjacent nodes
in the ST can communicate by using a symmetric en-
cryption algorithm with the secure link key. If we treat
the leader node as the root node, then the ST forms a
hierarchical tree structure, in which the internal nodes
have secure links with their father nodes and their
children nodes, and the leaf nodes only have secure links
with their father nodes.
2.1.4 Session Key Distribution
After the execution of Procedure S-C, a ST has been
constructed among all normal nodes. Next, we describe
Procedure S-K-D.
Algorithm 4 Procedure S-K-D (Session Key Distribution)
1: The leader node generates a random session key,
drawn uniformly from the key space, and sends to
its children in the ST encrypted by their secure link
key using any symmetric algorithm, e.g., AES or DES
(see [30]);
2: All of the one-hop children of the leader node in the
first level of the ST decrypt the encrypted message
and recover the session key;
3: Each child node reencrypts the recovered session key
with the secure link key of its children, and then
sends the encrypted message to its children;
4: Repeat Step 3 until all of the leaf nodes in the ST are
reached.
2.1.5 Topology Maintenance
Definition 2. (Node Event, denoted as η):
1) A Node Adding Event occurs when a single or a group
of nodes join the network topology;
2) A Node Deleting Event occurs when a single or a group
of nodes leave the network topology or are forced to leave.
Different with some related literatures, we unify the
definition of a single node adding (deleting) event and a
group node adding (deleting) event. With this definition,
a membership change can represented by a node event.
Definition 3. (Edge Event, denoted as ε):
1) An Edge Adding Event occurs when a single or a group
of edges are added to the network topology;
2) An Edge Deleting Event occurs when a single or a group
of edges are deleted from the network topology.
Frequently, an edge event arises from the high mobil-
ity of the nodes. The session key should be updated if
any node event occurs. But it is not necessary to update
the session key if only edge event occurs.
Definition 4. (Topology Gk): The topology, Gk(k =
0, 1, . . .), is an undirected graph Gk = (Vk, Gk), where Vk
is all the nodes in the network after the occurrence of kth
node event, and Ek = {(vi, vj) : vi ↔ vj}. In particular, G0
is the initial network topology with no node event occurs.
Our approach to maintain a connected ST is inspired
by the basic idea of the original Kruskal algorithm. It
is referred to as extended Kruskal algorithm. After the
usage of extended Kruskal algorithm in topology Gk,
a connected ST G+k can be derived. Hence, we have the
following definition.
Definition 5. (Topology G+k ): The topology, G
+
k (k =
0, 1, . . .), is a connected ST G+k = (V
+
k , E
+
k ), where V
+
k =
Vk, and E
+
k denotes all the secure links which have been
constructed after the extended Kruskal algorithm is applied.
Definition 6. (Topology G−k ): The topology, G
−
k (k =
0, 1, . . .), is an undirected graph G−k = (V
−
k , E
−
k ), where
V −k = Vk , and E
−
k denotes all the secure links which have
been constructed in G+k−1 . In particular, G
−
0 is a graph with
isolated nodes.
With the above terminologies, the evolution of the
network topology can be formally described as: after
the occurrence of kth node event, the leader node re-
constructs topology Gk and G
−
k . Generally, G
−
k is a
separated graph. Then, the extended Kruskal algorithm
is employed to construct a new connected ST G+k based
on G−k . The procedure to construct G
+
k based on G
−
k is
elaborated in Procedure T-M.
Remark 1. 1) The original Kruskal algorithm starts with
n isolated nodes, each node is treated as a separated
partial tree. The above algorithm is referred to as the
extended Kruskal algorithm because it may start with
a graph where several edges have been selected, and each
connected component is treated as a partial tree.
5Algorithm 5 Procedure T-M (Topology Maintenance) (The
Extended Kruskal Algorithm)
1: If G−k is disconnected, without loss of generality, we
assume that G−k is separated into p partial trees.
Based on p partial trees, in each step, select the
minimum previously unselected edge to connect two
separated partial trees, two partial trees merge into
one.
2: Repeat the above step until there is only one partial
tree. And finally, we get a new ST G+k .
2) The extended Kruskal algorithm unifies the processes of
constructing the initial ST and maintaining a ST. In
particular, k = 0 denotes the initial key establishment
process. In the initial key establishment process, the leader
node constructs G0 and G
−
0 . G
−
0 is treated as a graph
with isolated nodes, in which case the extended Kruskal
algorithm reduces to the original Kruskal algorithm, and
G−0 is exactly a minimum ST (MST) in G0.
3) The extended Kruskal algorithm preserves the recomputed
secure links in G+k , and thus reduces the computation and
communication overhead to construct new secure links.
2.2 The Completed Centralized Protocol
The Centralized Protocol
Step 1: After the occurrence of kth node event ηk(k =
0, 1, . . .), the leader node invokes Procedure T-C
to construct the topology Gk and G
−
j ;
Step 2: The leader node invokes Procedure C-W to up-
date the weight for each edge in G−k ;
Step 3: If G−k is connected, then set G
+
k = G
−
k , go to Step
6;
Step 4: If G−k is disconnected, the leader node invokes
Procedure T-M to construct a new ST G+k based
on G−k in Gk;
Step 5: The leader node invokes Procedure S-C to con-
struct the ST G+k among all normal nodes;
Step 6: Based on G+k , the leader node invokes Procedure
S-K-D to update a session key.
Remark 2. 1) The weight is updated every time when a
node event occurs, which implies that the weight is time-
variant.
2) k = 0 denotes the initial key establishment process, in
which the extended Kruskal algorithm reduces to the orig-
inal Kruskal algorithm. In this case, the leader node may
alternatively employ Prim algorithm to construct a MST.
It is shown that the Kruskal algorithm is appropriate
for a sparse graph, whereas it is better to use the Prim
algorithm for a dense graph.
3) G+k (k = 1, 2, . . .) is not necessarily a MST in Gk.
4) Between two node events, there may be several edge
events which may also destroy the connectivity of G−k .
Other existing hierarchical protocols are difficult to han-
dle the occurrence of edge events. Fortunately, our algo-
rithm is capable of addressing this situation efficiently.
In Procedure T-C, the leader node considers both node
events and edge events which may lead to the topology
change, and then reconstructs Gk and G
−
k .
3 THE DISTRIBUTED LST-BASED PROTOCOL
The above centralized protocol is appropriate for unbal-
anced MANETs which owns many strict assumptions.
In this section, we relax these strict assumptions and
let all of the nodes in MANETs be homogeneous with
limited abilities and resources. Our goal is to design
a group key agreement protocol in a general MANETs
environment without making additional assumptions on
the availability of any supporting infrastructure. We
assume that all nodes in MANETs are identical, the
transmission range of all nodes is denoted as dmax.
Definition 7. (Topology Gk): The topology, Gk(k =
0, 1, . . .), is an undirected graph Gk = (V k, Ek), where V k
is all the nodes in the network after the occurrence of kth
node event, and Ek = {(vi, vj) : dij ≤ dmax, vi, vj ∈ V k}
is the edge set of Gk. In particular, G0 is the initial network
topology with no node event occurs.
Definition 8. (Neighborhood Subgraph): N i(Gk) is the set
of nodes that node vi has directly connected relationship in
Gk, i.e., N
i(Gk) = {vj ∈ V k : dij ≤ dmax}. For an arbitrary
node vi ∈ V k, let G
i
k = (V
i
k, E
i
k) be the induced subgraph
of Gk such that V
i
k = N
i(Gk). G
i
k = (V
i
k, E
i
k) is called the
neighborhood subgraph of node vi.
For a node vi, in its neighborhood subgraph G
i
k,
it satisfies Assumption A1 that we formalized for the
centralized protocol. Because of this, each node can be
treated as a local leader node in its neighborhood sub-
graph. Our solution, inspired by [31], is that each node
constructs and maintains its LST in its neighborhood
subgraph. Let LST ik denote the constructed LST in G
i
k.
Then, the superposition of LST ik(i = 1, . . . , n) forms the
topology G
+
k .
Definition 9. (Topology G
+
k ): The topology G
+
k (k =
0, 1, . . .), is a subgraph of Gk, G
+
k = (V
+
k , E
+
k ), where
V
+
k = V k, and E
+
k denotes the superposition of edges
in LST ik(i = 1, . . . , n) for all nodes in Gk. The word
”superposition” means that an edge e ∈ E
+
k , if and only if
e ∈ LST ik, ∃i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The Distributed Protocol
Step 1: After the occurrence of kth node event ηk(k =
0, 1, . . .), each local leader node locally broad-
casts a Hello Message. The Hello Message
should contain its unique ID. In this way, the
leader node constructs the topology of its neigh-
borhood subgraph;
6Step 2: Each local leader node locally broadcasts a
Weight Message, which is subsequently ap-
plied to calculate the weight of each edge in its
neighborhood subgraph;
Step 3: Each local leader node invokes Procedure T-M
to maintain a LST, the LST in G
i
k is denoted
as LST ik. Then, the superposition of LST
i
k(i =
1, . . . , n) forms the topology G
+
k ;
Step 4: Construct G
+
k in the network. The construction
process is similar to Procedure S-C;
Step 5: A randomly selected node generates a new ses-
sion key and distributes it based on G
+
k . The
distribution process is similar to Procedure S-
K-D.
Remark 3. Compared with the centralized protocol, there are
several subtle differences in the distributed one.
• In Step 3, the original one global leader node is replaced
by several local leader nodes. The extended Kruskal
algorithm is performed by several local leader nodes
in a distributed way. Consequently, a node event may
cause several local leader nodes to reconstruct their LSTs
in the distributed protocol, whereas there is only one
reconstruction of the ST in the centralized protocol.
• In Step 3, the topology G
+
k may not be a ST. In general,
G
+
k is a connected graph with several redundant secure
links. See Theorem 1 for the connectivity proof.
• In Step 5, it is clear that a connected graph G+k can also
ensure the distribution of session key. If a node receives
several encrypted session key messages from different
nodes, it only forwards the session key the first time it
receives the message.
The verbal description of the above protocol is as
follows. After the occurrence of a node event, each
local leader node in the network reconstructs a LST in
its neighborhood subgraph independently using the ex-
tended Kruskal algorithm which is similar to the central-
ized protocol. Once LST ik(i = 1, 2, . . .) are reconstructed,
a new connected graph G
+
k is derived based on which a
new session key is distributed via secure links.
4 PROPERTIES OF THE TOPOLOGY G+k
In Remark 3, G
i
k is claimed to be a connected graph. The
proof is given below.
Definition 10. (Network Connectivity): For any two nodes
vi, vj ∈ V (G), node vi is said to be connected to node vj
(denoted as vi ⇔ vj) if there exists a path (vi = w0, . . . , wm =
vj) such that wj ↔ wj+1 , j = 0, . . . ,m − 1, where wk ∈
V (G), k = 0, . . . ,m. It follows that if u ⇔ v and u ⇔ w,
then v ⇔ w.
Lemma 1. For any two nodes vp, vq ∈ V k, if vp, vq ∈ LST
i
k,
i.e., vp, vq are on an identical ST, then vp ⇔ vq .
Lemma 2. For any two nodes vp, vq ∈ V k, if dpq < dmax,
then vp ⇔ vq .
Proof: If dpq < dmax, it is obvious that vp ∈ N
q(Gk),
then vp, vq ∈ LST
q
k . It holds from Lemma 2 that vp ⇔ vq .
Theorem 1. G
+
k preserves the connectivity of Gk , i.e., G
+
k
is connected if Gk is connected.
Proof: Suppose that Gk = (V k, Ek) is connected. For
any two nodes vp, vq ∈ V k, there exists at least one path
(vp = w0, . . . , wm = vq) from vp to vq , where (wi, wi+1) ∈
Ek, i = 0, . . . ,m− 1 and d(wi, wi+1) ≤ dmax. Since wi ⇔
wi+1, by Lemma 2, we have vp ⇔ vq .
Theorem 1 ensures that G
+
k is a connected graph.
However, the topology G
+
k may not be a ST, there may
be several redundant secure links in G
+
k .
The superposition of LST ik(i = 1, . . . , n) forms the
topology G
+
k . If all of LST
i
k(i = 1, . . . , n) are LMSTs, we
say that the topology G
+
k is derived under LMST.
Theorem 2. i) If network topology Gk is a ST, the extended
Kruskal algorithm is applied in a distributed way to derive
G
+
k . Then G
+
k is exactly a MST in Gk.
ii) If dmax ≥ max{dij}, where i, j = 1, . . . , n, or equiva-
lently, the network topology Gk is a complete graph, and the
corresponding G
+
k is derived under LMST, then G
+
k is exactly
a MST in Gk.
Proof: For i), according to Theorem 1, G
+
k preserves
the connectivity of Gk. Since Gk is a ST, which yields
G
+
k = Gk. It holds that G
+
k is exactly the MST in Gk.
For ii), if the network topology is a complete graph, we
have G
i
k = Gk, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. Since the corresponding
G
+
k is derived under LMST, which yields LST
i
k is the
MST in Gk, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. Since G
+
k is the superposition
of LST ik(i = 1, . . . , n), we have G
+
k is exactly a MST in
Gk.
The second part of Theorem 2 is confirmed by Fig.
2(f). Theorem 2 theoretically answers the question that
under what conditions, a MST can be derived in the
network topology. However, in general, the distributed
protocol will derive a graph with several redundant
edges. Let dlow be the minimum value of dmax, such
that Gk is a connected graph. Let dupper = max{dij},
where i, j = 1, . . . , n. It is shown from simulation that
if G
+
k is derived under LMST, with the increasing of
the transmission range dmax ∈ [dlow, dupper], the number
of redundant edges in G
+
k is first increasing and then
decreasing on average, as shown in Fig. 2. A large dmax
generates a dense graph, whereas a small dmax generates
a sparse graph. More specifically, if dmax > dupper, then
Gk is a complete graph and the corresponding G
+
k is
exactly a MST. That is to say, there are no redundant
edge in G
+
k , as shown in Fig. 2(f).
It is evident that the redundant secure links will
accelerate the key distribution process, whereas it re-
quires more communication and computation overhead
to construct them. Generally, according to Theorem 2,
LST ik(i = 1, . . . , n), where k = 1, 2, . . ., may not be a
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Fig. 2. There are 40 nodes which are generated randomly in a 10× 10 square area.
LMST. We can expect that the extended Kruskal algo-
rithm, which is a greedy algorithm, can construct approx-
imate LMST (ALMST) in each neighborhood subgraph.
Consequently, the number of redundant edges in G
+
k
derived under ALMST is expected to be larger than
that derived under LMST on average. It is demonstrated
by simulation that if G
+
k is derived under LMST, the
number of redundant edges in G
+
k is relatively small
in comparison with the total number of edges in Gk.
For instance, the total number of edges of Gk in Fig.
2(a) is 295, whereas there are only 8 redundant edges in
the corresponding G
+
k , as shown in Fig. 2(b). This fact
ensures the high-efficiency of the proposed LST-based
distributed protocol.
5 PROTOCOL PROPERTIES ANALYSIS
The proposed protocols feature the following basic prop-
erties.
• A hybrid approach, which is the combination of
key agreement and key distribution via symmetric
encryption, is exploited.
• A ST or LSTs are adopted to form a connected
network topology.
8• The extended Kruskal algorithm is employed to
handle dynamic events.
The group key agreement protocols which own the
above three basic properties belong to HSK (H means
hybrid, S indicates ST-based, and K implies the usage of
the extended Kruskal algorithm) group key agreement
scheme. According to the above analysis, our proposed
protocols are two typical cases under the HSK scheme.
6 INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
The mobile environment makes the MANETs susceptible
to attacks ranging from passive attacks to active attacks.
Passive attacks try to learn information just by listening
to the communication of the participants. In active at-
tacks, an attacker attempts to subvert the communication
in any way possible: by injecting message, intercepting
message, replaying message, altering message, etc..
6.1 Security against Passive Attacks
All of the information that is available by passive attack-
ers includes the three cases below.
Case 1: In Procedure S-C, it is needed to generate secure
link key publicly. Thus, the security against pas-
sive attacks depends on the selected two-party
public key exchange algorithm.
Case 2: In Procedure S-K-D, the transmitted session key
is encrypted by a certain symmetric encrypted
algorithm using the secure link key. Therefore,
the security depends on the selected symmetric
algorithm.
Case 3: Other information that transmitted between
nodes is useless for passive attacks.
6.2 Security against Active Attacks
We have analyzed the security of the proposed protocols
under the HSK scheme in an eavesdropper-only model.
If the protocols under the HSK scheme are secure in
the presence of only passive attackers. Then, we can
transform our unauthenticated protocols to secure au-
thenticated protocols by introducing Katz-Yung compiler
[32], see also [16], [25] for further details. We will not
elaborate it here.
7 CONCLUSIONS
A centralized protocol and a distributed protocol under
the HSK scheme for group key agreement protocol of
MANETs have been proposed and analyzed in detail.
The extended Kruskal algorithm shows its superiority
in achieving the reusability of the precomputed secure
links. There are several components in the HSK scheme
that should be carefully choose in practical applications,
such as the two-party key exchange algorithm and the
symmetric encryption algorithm. Remarkably, this paper
is not full-fledged. We are going to seek for help to
implement the proposed protocols in the real world
applications to assess their practical efficiency.
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